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COMMENTS
action is brought under article 2315 of the Civil Code by an
injured party who then dies, the survivor, if any, designated in
article 2315 may be substituted as party plaintiff; and that in all
other cases, when a party dies, his heirs, legatees, administra-
tor, or executor may be substituted as parties. It is to be hoped
that the proposed article will be adopted, and thereafter will be
construed as a legislative overruling of the unfortunate line of
cases commencing with the Chivers case and extending through
the McConnell decision. Both the legislative history of the Lou-
isiana rule against abatement, and two of the three lines of de-
cisions construing similar statutory rules in the various Ameri-
can jurisdictions, would call for such a construction. But the
only certain way of overturning these unfortunate decisions
would be to supplement the proposed article with an amend-
ment to article 2315 of the Civil Code, recognizing rights of
action ex delicto and quasi ex delicto as property rights trans-
mitted to the heirs of the obligee on his death.
John M. Shaw
Sufficiency of Indictments
Interpretation of Article 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure
An indictment at common law was required to present the
facts of the crime with elaborate detail.1 This requirement has
received considerable criticism 2 and the modern trend has been
to limit by statute the detail formerly required in an indict-
ment.3 Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that all crimes in the Criminal Code may be charged by a "short
form" indictment, which contains only a statement of the very
1. See an example in Comment, Indictment Forms-A Technical Loop-
hole for the Accused, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1945).
2. See Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 119 (1944); Comment, Indictment Forms-A Technical Loophole for
the Accused, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1946); Comment, The Short Form
Indictment-History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REVEW 78 (1944); Note, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1947).
3. In regard to the short form, see ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
154 (1930); for legislation comparable to article 227 of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the requisites for the long form
indictment, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 958 (Deering 1949); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-1105 (Burns 1933); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.17 (1945); NEV. COMP. LAWS
§ 10856 (1929); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-21-8 (1953).
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basic elements of the crime, for example, "A.B. murdered C.D.' 4
The other elements of the crime are stated in the Criminal Code,
and if additional information is desired, it may usually be ob-
tained by a bill of particulars from the district attorney.5 Many
important crimes are not included in the Criminal Code,6 how-
ever, and hence must be charged by the "long form" indictment.
Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
long form indictment "must state every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the offense, but it need do no more, and
it is immaterial whether the language of the statute creating the
offense, or words unequivocally conveying the meaning of the
statute, be used."' 7 (Emphasis added.) The article does not pur-
port to authorize an indictment as abbreviated as the "short
form," but the trend away from the strict common law require-
ments indicates that it should not require a statement of minute
detail.
In order to determine what detail the jurisprudence has
considered necessary, it is helpful to consider the purposes of an
indictment. First, it should inform the accused of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged; second, it should also
inform the court so that the taking of evidence might be regu-
lated; and third, it should be sufficiently definite to support a plea
of former jeopardy.8
To what extent should an indictment set forth the nature
of the crime in order to fulfill these basic purposes? The indict-
ment should state all the essential elements of the crime.9 Ideas
have varied as to what constitutes an essential element. The
United States Supreme Court in 1875 noted that where the defi-
nition of an offense "includes generic terms, it is not sufficient
that the indictment shall charge the offense in the same generic
4. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950). Although the form is brief, the defendant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him
(LA. CONST. art. I, § 10) is not abridged. See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure,
7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 288, 296 (1947); Comment, The Short Form Indict-
ment-History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
78 (1944); Ralston, Sufficiency of the Charge in an Indictment in Louisiana,
20 TUL. L. REV. 220 (1945).
5. State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d 890 (1953) and cases cited.
6. Among these are laws relating to motor vehicles, LA. R.S. 14:207
(1950); the maintenance of a disorderly place, LA. R.S. 14:281 (1950); wire
tapping, LA. R.S. 14:322 (1950); false or illegal registration for voting, LA.
R.S. 18:222 (1950); and narcotics, LA. R.S. 40:961-984 (1950).
7. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
8. State v. Scheuering, 76 So.2d 921 (La. 1954).
9. See State v. Toney, 205 La. 451, 17 So.2d 624 (1944), relied on in State v.
Kelley, 225 La, 495, 73 So.2d 437 (1954),
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terms as in the definition; but it must state the species,-it must
descend to particulars.""' On the other hand, one writer in 1945
suggested that article 227 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure probably was never intended to require more than
the language of the statute in charging the crime." If article 227
was meant to be a codification of the Louisiana jurisprudence
existing at the time of its adoption, 12 there are decisions prior
to the adoption of the Code in 1928 which hold that the language
of the statute is not specific enough. For instance, in one case
the indictment charged the defendant with keeping a "disorderly
house," as the statute was worded.1 3 The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that this was a mere conclusion of law, saying that
"'there are many kinds of disorder which are not indictable....
The proper course is to specify what the disorder is.' "'14 In an-
other case defendant was being prosecuted under a statute which
prohibited one's giving of false information when offering to
vote.15 The court found the indictment defective because it
neither stated that defendant ,was a qualified voter nor described
the particular election adequately. However, the court has held
valid an indictment merely charging the defendant with keeping
a "blind tiger,' 6 where the statute had defined a "blind tiger"
as a place where alcoholic beverages were sold.
The same problem of stating the essential elements exists
also where the crime is charged in language "equivalent" to
that of the statute.17 In one such case the defendant was charged
with possessing, with intent to sell or display, certain "indecent"
pictures and writings.' The statute forbade possession of those
which were "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or sexually in-
decent."' 9 The court found that the language of the indictment
was not equivalent to that of the statute. In another decision
the indictment stated that the defendants "intentionally maintain
10. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875).
11. Morrow, The 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code in 1945: A Small Voice
from the Past, 19 TUL. L. REv. 483, 490 (1945).
12. See Annot., Art. 227, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. OF 1928 ANN. (Adams
1929).
13. State ex re7. Etie v. Foster, 112 La. 746, 36 So. 670 (1904).
14. Id. at 747, 36 So. at 670.
15. State v. Schwartz, 137 La. 277, 68 So. 608 (1915).
16. State v. Tuggle, 151 La. 1061, 1062, 92 So. 699 (1922).
17. State v. Roth, 224 La. 439, 69 So.2d 741 (1953); State v. Wilson, 173
La. 347, 137 So. 57 (1931); State v. Menard, 150 La. 324, 90 So. 665 (1922);
State v. Hainey, 142 La. 407, 76 So. 818 (1917); State v. Hood, 6 La. Ann. 179
(1851).
18. State v. Roth, 224 La. 439, 441, 69 So.2d 741, 742 (1953).
19. Id. at 443, 69 So.2d at 743; La. Acts 1950, No. 314, p. 511, amending
and re-enacting LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950).
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a place . . . to be used habitually as a meeting place for . . .
criminals to plan and prepare for the commission of sundry
crimes .... -20 It was found not to charge an "illegal or im-
moral purpose" within the meaning of the statute.
Further examples of elements of crimes which have been
held to be essential to the validity of an indictment may be men-
tioned. Failure to include the element of "breaking" in an
attempt to charge the crime of "breaking and entering" was
fatal.21 Likewise, where the fraudulent use of another's name
for certain purposes constituted a crime, the indictment which
omitted to state defendant's purpose was invalid.22 The accused
persons in another case23 had caused a child two years of age to
become intoxicated and were prosecuted for intentional mis-
treatment of a minor. The indictment did not state that the
defendants were seventeen years or older, an essential element
of the crime, and was consequently held void. Also held insuffi-
cient was an indictment for resisting an officer which neglected
to state that the defendant had knowledge that the person re-
sisted was a law-enforcement officer. 24 Where the sale of in-
toxicating liquors for beverage purposes was made criminal, a
conviction based on an indictment which did not include the
essential phrase, "for beverage purposes," was reversed.25 Failure
to allege specific intent has been held to invalidate an indict-
ment.26 Even where the defendants were charged with breaking
and entering "the American Hat Company" with intent to
commit larceny, the indictment was found invalid because no
mention was made that the American Hat Company was a
building or structure.2 7
Another facet of the problem of sufficiency in indictments is
that involving the so-called multiple-crime statutes. The statute
which prohibits disturbing the peace, for example, lists several
ways in which the crime is committed. 2- It has been held that
a charge merely of "disturbing the peace" is insufficient. The
particular way in which the peace was disturbed must be set
forth.29 A similar result was obtained in a case in which it was
20. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 181, 29 So.2d 758, 759 (1947).
21. State v. Gendusa, 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938).
22. State v. Halaby, 148 La. 553, 87 So. 270 (1921).
23. State v. Toney, 205 La. 451, 17 So.2d 624 (1944).
24. State v. Gros, 216 La. 103, 43 So.2d 232 (1949).
25. State v. Bulloch, 151 La. 593, 92 So. 127 (1922).
26. State v. Quinn, 136 La. 435, 67 So. 206 (1915).
27. State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
28. LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950).
29. State v. Morgan, 204 La. 499, 15 So.2d 866 (1943); State v. Verdin, 192
La, 275, 187 So. 666 (1939),
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not stated how the defendant had violated the statute prohibiting
indecent behavior with juveniles.,A An indictment was also held
inadequate because it failed to distinguish which of the many
gambling crimes defendant had committed.3 1
A recent case involving a multiple-crime statute is State v.
Kelley.3 2 In this case the defendant was convicted of violating
the voter registration law by submitting false information in his
application for registration. The long form indictment had not
particularized the false information given. Instead of using the
words of the statute, "shall knowingly present" false informa-
tion, it had charged that the defendant "willfully and unlaw-
fully" gave the false information. The court, in holding the
indictment invalid, pointed out that the false information was
not set forth, and that the defendant was not charged with
having knowingly submitted false information. If the court gave
primary consideration to the fact that the word "willfully" was
used instead of "knowingly," it may be argued in support of the
case that knowledge is an essential element of the crime and
therefore must be charged in the indictment. If, on the other
hand, the court gave greater weight to the proposition that the
false information given should have been expressly set forth,
the decision would amount to a partial reversion, at least, to the
technical requirements of the early common law.
Justice McCaleb contended in his dissent in the Kelley case
that a bill of particulars would have amply satisfied the accused's
right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him
since the defendant was told "what he did and how he did it.'"33
The bill of particulars has served this supplemental function in
Louisiana in cases in which the indictment lacked details the
defendant desired in order to prepare his defense, but stated all
the essential elements.a4 Justice McCaleb's position is that the
majority of the court has overlooked the difference between the
essential elements and the details. It may be noted that if the
indictment or information lacks a fundamental element, it
cannot be remedied by a bill of particulars, since the prosecution
rests solely on the charge as expressed in the indictment and
not on the indictment as amended by the bill.
3 5
30. State v. Hebert, 205 La. 110, 17 So.2d 3 (1944).
31. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945); cf. State v. Kend-
rick, 203 La. 63, 13 So.2d 387 (1943), criticized in Ralston, Sufficiency of the
Charge in an IncLictment in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 220, 227 (1945).
32. 225 La. 495, 73 So.2d 437 (1954).
33. Id. at 506, 73 So.2d at 441.
34. State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 22 So.2d 196 (1945) and cases cited.
35. State v. Long, 129 La. 777, 56 So. 884 (1911).
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In conclusion, it might be said that the line between essential
elements and those elements which are mere details and can be
obtained through a bill of particulars is difficult to define. Be-
cause of the fact that a presumption of innocence exists in favor
of the defendant, 36 any substantial defect in the indictment
should be construed against the state. An indictment must state
"every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense,"
but "it need do no more." If effect is to be given to the latter
clause, then it would be undesirable to require a greatly detailed
statement of criminal liability in an indictment. The Kelley
case and the above discussed illustrations clearly indicate that
the Louisiana court has been and is today cautious in applying
the rather liberal language of article 227. From the jurisprudence
can be concluded only that article 227 requires a full and com-
plete statement of the essentials of criminal liability. Un-
certainty, however, exists as to how particularized this statement
must be. Other states seem to have liberalized the requirements
of sufficiency in indictments and it appears that "the trend [is]
away from stressing old common-law technical necessities. '37 The
position taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Kelley
case appears inconsistent with this trend, and could, if continued,
result in burdening the indictment with a full statement of the
details of the crime, a function which can best be served by the
bill of particulars.
Patrick T. Caffery
Theft Between Spouses in Louisiana
The Louisiana Criminal Code defines the crime of theft as
"the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which
belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to
the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent con-
duct, practices or representations."1 The Code also states that
an essential element of the crime is "an intent to deprive the
other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the mis-
appropriation or taking."2 The purpose of this comment is to
36. LA. R.S. 15:387 (1950).
37. Kaplan, Criminal Procedure, in 1953 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN
LAW 741, 747.
1. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
2. Ibid.
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